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ABSTRACT 
This thesis predicts how United States Supreme Court Associate Justice John Paul 
Stevens would have ruled on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage if the issue were 
to have come before him while he was on the Court.  The hypothesis is that he would 
have found a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.  The hypothesis is substantiated 
based on an analysis of Stevens‟ record in ten specific cases.  The thesis puts forth the 
argument that these ten cases most accurately predict how Stevens would have voted on 
the constitutional issue.  Stevens‟ opinions and dissents in these cases are examined.  
Additionally, included is an analysis of his viewpoints, as evidenced in interviews, oral 
“arguments,” public speeches, and articles.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
There is perhaps nothing more controversial in American society than social 
issues.  Social issues are polarizing and elicit strong reactions from both conservatives 
and liberals.  Many conservatives often feel that social issues are best decided by 
legislative bodies rather than unelected members of the judicial branch (Dershowitz, 
2001).  Liberals believe that the rights of the minority should be placed out the hands of 
the majority and decided by the independent judiciary branch (Hirsch, 2005).  
When Massachusetts became the first state in the United Stated to legalize same-
sex marriage in 2004 (Same-Sex, 2009), the issue became one of the most polarizing 
social topics (Marcus, 2006).  In response, many states have amended their constitutions 
to prevent same-sex marriage (Same-Sex, 2004).  Furthermore, Congress has voted twice 
on a federal constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage, but it failed to pass both 
times (Kellman, 2006).  As of 2010, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, and 
Washington, D.C. have also legalized same-sex marriage either through judicial rulings 
or legislative action (Urbina, 2009).  In 2008, a California Supreme Court ruling briefly 
allowed same-sex marriage, but a voter referendum overturned that decision just six 
months later (Same-Sex, 2009).     
As same-sex marriage and other relationships for homosexuals become legal, the 
United States is becoming a patchwork of states where the unions of same-sex couples 
are allowed in some states but not recognized in others (Rauch, 2004).  Because most 
states do not recognize same-sex unions performed in other states (Vestal, 2009), the 
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issue has and will become an increasingly difficult issue for the courts to address 
(Marcus, 2006).  Will Arizona or Kentucky eventually have to recognize a same-sex 
marriage legalized in Iowa or Connecticut?   
At issue is Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution.  Commonly known as 
the Full Faith and Credit, this clause states: 
Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and  
 
judicial proceedings of every other state.  And the Congress may by general laws  
 
prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be  
 
proved, and the effect thereof. (U.S. Constitution) 
 
It would appear that a state would be required to recognize same-sex marriages  
 
performed elsewhere, “but whether or not it actually does is a matter of debate” (Tuccille,  
 
2009, ¶ 4).   
 
In 1996, the United States Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act  
 
(DOMA).  It permits states to refuse recognition of same-sex marriages performed  
 
in another state.  And it also provides a federal definition of what marriage is: a union  
 
between a man and woman (DOMA, 1996).   
 
 Since its inception, the constitutionality of DOMA has been debated by political  
 
leaders and legal experts alike (Battle, 2004).  There has been a “long-held standard of 
 
American case law known as the „public policy exception‟ [which] exempts any state  
 
from recognizing a law from another state if it is found to be „offensive‟ to the receiving  
 
states‟ public policy” (Battle, 2004, ¶ 12).  Despite the public policy exception, states  
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overwhelmingly recognize heterosexual marriages performed out of state – this is done to  
 
maintain the stability of law (Battle, 2004). 
  
 Critics contend that DOMA goes beyond the public policy exception because only  
 
gays and lesbians are singled out.  Battle (2004) states that this is in direct violation of the  
 
equal rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.  However,  
 
supporters of DOMA contend that homosexuals have “no legal precedent to reinforce  
 
their central position...[because] marriage laws were not invented to persecute…[and]  
 
deny marriage to homosexuals” (Jackson, 2006, p. 237).  Instead, marriage laws in the  
 
United States have always been about a union between a man and a woman, not two  
 
members of the same gender (Jackson, 2006). 
 
 The Supreme Court case of Loving v. Virginia is often used as the model for what 
the gay marriage movement hopes to accomplish on a national scale (Jackson, 2006).  In 
Loving, two residents of Virginia, a white man and a black woman, married in 
Washington, D.C.  When they returned to their home state, they were arrested for 
violating the state‟s anti-miscegenation law.  They were convicted and sentenced to one 
year in prison, but the sentence was suspended for twenty-five years so long as the couple 
left the state.  With help from the American Civil Liberties Union, the couple sued and 
the case eventually made it to the Supreme Court. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967). 
The Court ruled unanimously that Virginia had violated the couple‟s equal rights 
that are guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The opinion eviscerated 
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Virginia‟s anti-interracial marriage law and any other state‟s similar statute.  Writing for 
the majority, Chief Justice Earl Warren held that “the freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men...[it] is one of the „basic civil rights of man,‟ fundamental to our very existence 
and survival” (ibid, p. 12).  In addition, “Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or 
not to marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed 
on by the State” (ibid, p. 12). 
 Same-sex marriage supporters believe that the basis of Loving should be applied 
to homosexuals because the same discriminatory principle is being applied: preventing a 
person from marrying the person of their choice (Jackson, 2006).  Extending gays and 
lesbians to the right to marry would be “a logical extension of the same liberal tradition 
that fought for civil rights for blacks and women” (Reich, 2004, p. 70).  Just like blacks 
and women before them, homosexuals are viewed as a threat to the system that has been 
traditionally run by white males: “They made every effort to block the Civil Rights Act, 
fight desegregation, and prevent the Equal Rights Amendment from becoming part of the 
Constitution.  Now they want to block the civil rights of gay Americans” (Reich, 2004, p. 
70).  Most recently, the Full Faith and Credit clause “has been used at the appeals courts 
level to force socially conservative states to recognize adoptions by same-sex couples that 
have been approved by other states” (Tuccille, 2009, ¶ 8).  If this has been the case, gay 
rights activists argue, then it should be used for marriage as well (Tuccille, 2009).   
Critics argue that using Loving as an analogy for same-sex marriage is not correct.  
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Loving dealt with race and it did not redefine the definition of what marriage has been for 
thousands of years: a union between a man and a woman (Jackson, 2006).  And that is 
why there are laws like DOMA in place to preserve traditional marriage, critics contend 
(Gaines, 2010). 
Eventually it will be “imperative that the [Supreme Court] clarify…the marriage 
issue” (Marcus, 2006, p. 410).  The United States is “simply too big and too diverse” 
(Rensberger, 2007, p. 31) to allow multiple interpretations of marriage; a single standard 
will have to established (Rensberger, 2007).  It is impossible to predict “the exact form a 
same-sex marriage case heard by the Court will…take, from which jurisdiction it will 
originate, which law will be challenged, and on what grounds” (Marcus, 2006, p. 414), 
but there will be constitutional questions that the justices of Supreme Court will have to 
answer (Marcus, 2006). 
This thesis argues John Paul Stevens, if he were still on the Court, would rule that 
same-sex marriage is a constitutional right.  In every case concerning gay rights that 
Stevens considered, he ruled in its favor (Constitutional, 2009).  Furthermore, he firmly 
supports civil liberties and equal rights (Smith, 2006).  Because of Stevens‟ 
jurisprudential history, this thesis argues that Justice Stevens would support same-sex 
marriage. 
In Chapter Two, the methodology used in this thesis will be explained.  Chapter 
Three will examine the jurisprudence of Stevens and how it influenced his decision 
making when it comes to Supreme Court cases.  Chapters Four and Five will then go into 
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detail about the two essential foundations of this thesis‟ claim on which Stevens would 
build his support for same-sex marriage: right to privacy and equal rights. Finally, 
Chapter Six will sum up the findings. 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHOD 
Of all the current and living retired justices of the Supreme Court, John Paul 
Stevens is “gay Americans‟ most reliable ally” (Murdoch & Price, 2001, p. 511).  He 
once served as the leader of the liberal bloc of the Court (Wittes, 2006) and was its 
strongest voice (Savage, 2007).  His ability to influence other justices to agree with his 
jurisprudential philosophy is well-documented, especially regarding Anthony Kennedy‟s 
all-important swing vote (Rosen, 2007).  In addition, as the most senior associate justice, 
Stevens had the ability to assign opinions.  Thus: “When the chief justice is in the 
majority and Stevens [was] in the minority, Stevens [decided] who [would] write the 
principal dissent; when the roles [were] reversed, Stevens [assigned] the majority 
opinion” (Rosen, 2007, ¶ 5).  This would have been decisive in getting a Supreme Court 
opinion that upheld the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, if such a case had arrived 
at the Court during Stevens‟ tenure. 
 In order to predict the constitutional principles from which Stevens would have 
based his decision supporting same-sex marriage, his judicial record in certain 
constitutional areas must be examined.  Recent same-sex marriage cases have only been 
decided by state courts and not at the federal level.  These cases have been accepted or 
rejected based on state constitutional provisions.  There is not any precedent involving 
the issue at the federal level.  Therefore, it cannot be known for sure exactly what 
constitutional principles would be used to decide a case involving same-sex marriage at 
the federal level.   
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The Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that there is a constitutionally protected 
right to marry” (Gerstmann, 2004, p. 69), although the cases have only dealt with 
marriage between a man and a woman (Gerstmann, 2004).  However, enough precedent 
exists in other areas of constitutional law that could be used to help decide whether same-
sex marriage should be legalized or not.  The two strongest legal arguments for same-sex 
marriage would be based on the right to privacy and equal rights.  Since the right to 
privacy (discussed in Chapter Four) and equal rights (discussed in Chapter Five) have 
been used as an extension of civil rights, the Supreme Court would most likely 
incorporate them in a case involving same-sex marriage (Feigen, 2004).   
Because he is an ardent supporter of civil liberties like the right to privacy 
(Arledge, 1989) and equal rights (Smith, 2006), this thesis will argue that Stevens would 
have found a constitutional right to same-sex marriage based on the constitutional 
grounds of right to privacy and equal rights.  This hypothesis is substantiated by an 
analysis of the following: (a) Stevens‟ record in ten specific cases (see Table 2.1); (b) 
Stevens‟ writings in law journals; (c) viewpoints that he has publicly expressed either 
through interviews, oral arguments, and public speeches; and (d) a literature review of 
any other applicable facts. 
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Table 2.1: The Ten United States Supreme Court Cases Used to Argue that John Paul 
Stevens Would Have Found a Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage 
 
 
U.S. Supreme Court Case 
 
 
John Paul Stevens 
Supports or Rejects 
 
 
1. Roe v. Wade (1973) – This case struck down laws in 
every state that restricted a women‟s access to an abortion 
on the basis of a right to privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973). 
 
 
 
Supports 
 
2. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey (1992) - This case upheld the ruling of Roe‟s right to 
privacy, which constitutionally protected a woman‟s right 
to choose. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 
 
 
 
Supports 
 
 
3. Stenberg v. Carhart (2000) – The Court ruled if 
exceptions are not made to protect a mother‟s life, partial-
birth abortions are an unconstitutional violation of a 
woman‟s right to privacy. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 
U.S. 914 (2000). 
 
 
 
 
Supports 
 
4. Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) – The Court held that the 
Constitution did not protect a right for sexual relations 
between homosexuals. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986). 
 
 
 
Rejects 
 
5. Lawrence v. Texas (2003) – The Court overruled Bowers 
by striking down a Texas law that criminalized sexual 
intimacy between consenting adults of the same gender.  
Furthermore, any remaining sodomy laws in the United 
States were deemed unconstitutional. See Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 
 
 
 
Supports 
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6. Romer v. Evans (1996) – The Court struck down a 
Colorado constitutional amendment that would have 
prevented sexual orientation from being protected by 
discrimination laws. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). 
 
 
 
 
Supports 
 
 
7. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) – The Court held 
that despite existing state antidiscrimination laws, private 
organizations are allowed to exclude certain individuals 
based on the First Amendment‟s freedom of association. 
See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 
 
 
 
Rejects 
 
8. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services (1998) - The 
Court held that protection afforded by Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was applicable to workplace 
harassment involving members of the same sex. See 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 
(1998). 
 
 
 
 
Supports 
 
9. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System 
v. Southworth et al (2000) – The Court ruled that 
mandatory student fees at public universities can be used to 
support gay student groups despite protests from 
conservative students. See Board of Regents of Univ. of 
Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
 
 
 
 
Supports 
 
10. United States v. Virginia (1996) – The Court held that 
the male-only admission policy at the Virginia Military 
Institute violated the Fourteenth Amendment‟s Equal 
Protection Clause. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515 (1996). 
 
 
 
 
Supports 
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CHAPTER THREE: JOHN PAUL STEVENS‟ JURISPRUDENCE 
 On June 28, 2010, at age 90, John Paul Stevens, retired after 34 years of service 
on the United States Supreme Court (Gresko, 2010).  He was the senior associate justice 
on the Court (Greenhouse, 2007) and one of its longest-serving members in history 
(Rosen, 2007).  Appointed to the Court in 1975 by President Gerald Ford (Brinkley, 
2007), Stevens evolved to become a powerful and influential justice (Smith, 2006).  With 
his penchant for bowties and nice-guy attitude, Stevens often moved the Court to his side 
with a philosophy of law, also known as jurisprudence, that is “clear thinking and original 
[in] approach” (Sloan, 2005, ¶ 9).   
As a judge, Stevens took a case-by-case approach to issues that came before him 
(Siskel, 2002).  In an article titled “The Supreme Court of the United States, Reflections 
After a Summer Recess,” Stevens wrote that when he decided a case he did so by 
identifying “the problem that needs to be solved…[so that] the best solution [can be 
found]” (Stevens, 1985c, p. 448).  As the years passed, Stevens‟ search for the best 
solution led him to increasingly liberal results (Rosen, 2007).   
In fact, before his retirement, Stevens was the most liberal justice on the Court 
(Rosen, 2007).  In contrast, he was considered a moderate when he first joined the Court 
(Arledge, 1989).  For example, on the issue of civil rights, a study of Stevens‟ voting 
patterns revealed that in 1989 he was voting in support of civil rights 55.9% of the time 
(Arledge, 1989).  By 2004, that rate had soared to 91.7% (Epstein & Walker, 2001).     
One of the core themes of Stevens‟ jurisprudence is his concern for people‟s 
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liberties (or freedoms), especially those of minority groups (Arledge, 1989).  In an article 
titled “The Third Branch,” Stevens noted that “one of the elements of liberty is the right 
to be respected as a human being” (Stevens, 1986, p. 278).   Stevens believes that the 
“individual dignity…[of] people whose interest are not traditionally labeled fundamental 
may deserve protection if the government treats them thoughtlessly” (Popkin, 1989, p. 
1135).  In other words, minorities sometimes have to be protected from the majority 
(Greenburg, 2007).    
Stevens‟ commitment to civil liberties has led to him being labeled a “judicial 
activist” (Greenhouse, 2007).  “Judicial activism” is when judges make the law rather 
than interpret it.  This charge occurs most frequently when people feel that a judge does 
not interpret the Constitution as its writers intended (Roosevelt, 2006).  The “plausibility 
of the charge of activism…depends…on the ideas that there is a clearly correct answer 
[in the Constitution]…that judges are disregarding” (Roosevelt, 2006, p. 15).  The 
Constitution, though, is often unclear about multiple issues.  Therefore, the “complaint 
that judges are departing from the plain meaning of the Constitution has very little 
force…for the words of the Constitution themselves convey very little information about 
how to decide particular cases” (Roosevelt, 2006, p. 16).   
According to Stevens, the Constitution is a “mysterious document” (Stevens, 
1985a, p. 437) that is silent on many different issues (Stevens, 1985a).  When it is, 
Stevens believes that a judge‟s role is to find solutions (Stevens, 1982) so that people‟s 
fundamental rights are protected even if the Constitution does not specifically mention 
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them (Gottlieb, 2000).  Stevens likened the role of a judge to that of a mystery novelist: 
“The skillful author of a mystery story may provide us with a handful of clues in his first 
chapter, but then require us to consider a variety of alternative solutions” (Stevens, 
1985a, p. 437).   
 The ambiguousness of the Constitution has led to the evolution of two different 
camps of constitutional interpretation (O‟Brien, 2005).  Interpretivists “generally hold 
that the constitutional interpretation should be confined to the text and historical context 
of provisions of the Constitution” (O‟Brien, 2005, p. 302).  In contrast, non-interpretivists 
“maintain that that constitutional interpretation frequently requires going beyond text and 
historical context to structural arguments grounded in the Constitution and to broader 
principles of constitutional politics” (O‟Brien, 2005, p. 302).  According to Andrew 
Siegel, a former law clerk for Stevens, his former boss would fall somewhere in the 
middle of the two camps: “`Stevens believes that constitutional decision-making is 
conducted through the interpretation of a mix of various sources – a complex balancing 
act‟” (quoted in Toobin, 2010, ¶ 66). 
Stevens acknowledges the fact that it is not a judge‟s place to make the law, but 
rather to interpret it (Greenhouse, 2005).  While on the Court, he practiced considerable 
judicial restraint by deferring to the legislative bodies of government (Gottlieb, 2000).  
However, Stevens says that “when it is necessary to announce a new proposition of law 
in order to decide an actual case or controversy between adversary litigants, a court has a 
duty to exercise” (Stevens, 1982, p. 180).  He did this even if that “judicial 
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interpretation…involves overruling…[laws and] policies…of the legislative and 
executive branches of the federal and state governments” (Halpern & Lamb, 1982, p. 8)   
Despite his willingness to correct laws and policies that he believed were 
unconstitutional, Stevens showed great respect for stare decisis (Stevens, 1982), the legal 
principle that holds the Supreme Court should not overrule its previous decisions 
(Abraham, 1992).  Respecting precedent is important because it “promotes legal 
stability…[and helps] maintain similar treatment of persons” (Gerstmann, 2004, p. 142).  
Yet he did overrule precedents that he believed were wrongly decided (Abraham, 1992).  
During his Senate confirmation hearings prior to becoming a Supreme Court justice, 
Stevens discussed his view about precedent: 
I would say that I certainly would weigh very carefully any decision that had 
already been reached by a prior Court and I would be most  reluctant to depart 
from prior precedent without a clear showing that departure was 
warranted….[however] I think there are occasions, particularly in constitutional 
adjudication, where it is necessary to recognize that a prior decision may have 
been erroneous and should be reexamined. (quoted in Nomination, 1975) 
In the article “Legal Questions in Perspective,” Stevens stated that he is able to 
approach the law from “four different perspectives…as a citizen, as a law student, as a 
lawyer, and as a judge” (Stevens, 1985b, p. 1).  These perspectives have undoubtedly 
influenced how he ruled on constitutional questions that came before him (Levin, 2005) 
so that he could make sure that the Court is “the protector of groups denied protection by 
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the more democratic branches of government” (Arledge, 1989, p. 587).  Chapters Four 
and Five will continue the discussion of Stevens‟ jurisprudence.  Chapter Four will focus 
on his jurisprudence regarding the right to privacy.  Chapter Five will focus on his 
jurisprudence regarding equal rights. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
 
Stevens consistently ruled in favor of upholding the constitutional principle of the 
right to privacy.  According to Richards (2005), the right to privacy is a “basic human 
right to intimate life” (p. 89).  In other words, people have the right to be left alone by 
government and make their own decisions about their life (Gerstmann, 2004).  Stevens 
defines privacy as “`a constitutional right, and any activity which a majority of Justices 
determine is „private‟ is logically encompassed therein, regardless of the nature or history 
of the particular interest claimed‟” (quoted in Horan, Forsythe, & Grant, 1987, p. 262).   
Over the last few decades, the Court has “reaffirmed the constitutional protection 
of personal decisions relating to marriage, procreating…homosexual sex…and a person‟s 
right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters fundamentally 
affecting that person” (Feigen, 2004, ¶ 2).  Although “marriage is a public act, marriage 
is among the most personal of all decisions” (Gerstmann, 2004, p. 109).  Therefore, the 
right to privacy would very likely be a cornerstone for a ruling favoring support for same-
sex marriage (Feigen, 2004). Because the right to privacy is now a part of constitutional 
law and Supreme Court precedent involving heterosexual marriage has incorporated it, 
many hope that same-sex marriage will also fall under this legal umbrella.   
To better understand Stevens‟ jurisprudence on the right of privacy and why he 
would he would have applied it to a case involving same-sex marriage, examining his 
stance on issues like abortion and gay rights is essential.  A summary of Stevens‟ record 
in right to privacy cases can be found in Table 4.1.
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 The belief that the Constitution protects a person‟s right to privacy has its roots in 
Justice John Harlan‟s 1961 dissent in Poe v. Ullman.  The case concerned the 
constitutionality of a Connecticut law that forbad its citizens from using birth control.  
Harlan believed that the Fourteenth Amendment‟s Due Process Clause protected people 
from unreasonable intrusion. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).  Harlan‟s dissent 
in Poe would eventually become the “foundation for almost every subsequent argument 
in favor of sexual and procreational freedom from contraception and abortion to 
homosexual rights” (Lazarus, 1999, p. 336).   
Four years after Poe, Harlan‟s call for the establishment of a right to privacy 
became law when he concurred with the majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.  It 
overturned the Connecticut law as well as any other state laws against married couple‟s 
use of contraceptives.  This ruling enshrined the precedent that the Constitution gave 
people the right of privacy. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
In his majority opinion, Justice William Douglas noted that the Constitution does 
not contain the word “privacy,” but the Bill of Rights provides guarantees that make it a 
fundamental right.  Moreover, Douglas wrote that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, recognizes any rights that are not specifically in the Constitution 
(ibid).  
Eisenstadt v. Baird followed Griswold in 1972.  The case invalidated a 
Massachusetts law that banned the use of contraceptives by those who were not married, 
thus expanding the right to privacy to unmarried persons. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
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U.S. 438 (1972).  The Court ruled that “if the right to privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear 
or beget a child” (ibid, p. 453). 
 In 1973, the right to privacy was expanded further in Roe v. Wade in which the 
Court struck down laws restricting abortion.  The lawsuit was filed by an unmarried, 
pregnant woman who alleged that a Texas law forbidding abortion violated her 
constitutional rights.  The Court declared that a woman‟s right to terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy was constitutionally protected.  It allowed less restricted access to abortion 
during the first trimester, but permitted states to impose more restrictions as the viability 
of the fetus increased.  Any restrictions on abortion outside of the parameters of Roe must 
be narrowly tailored. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 All of the previous cases were decided before Stevens arrived on the Court.  
During his first year on the Court, he immediately exhibited a jurisprudence that 
supported the right to privacy and a respect for precedent set by the previously mentioned 
cases.  In the case of Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, Stevens supported 
striking down Missouri‟s requirement that a married woman must get consent from her 
husband before she could get an abortion. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976) 
 Stevens did, however, support the parental consent provision of the law in 
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth: an unmarried minor had to obtain the 
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consent of at least one parent before an abortion could be performed (ibid).  Stevens‟ 
reason for supporting it was based on the age of the person involved:  
The State's interest in the welfare of its young citizens justifies a variety of  
 
protective measures. Because he may not foresee the consequences of his  
 
decision, a minor may not make an enforceable bargain.  The State's interest in  
 
protecting a young person from harm justifies the imposition of restraints on his  
 
or her freedom even though comparable restraints on adults would be  
 
constitutionally impermissible...The Court assumes that parental consent is an  
 
appropriate requirement if the minor is not capable of understanding the  
 
procedure and of appreciating its consequences and those of available  
 
alternatives. This assumption is, of course, correct and consistent with the  
 
predicate which underlies all state legislation seeking to protect minors from the  
 
consequences of decisions they are not yet prepared to make.  In all such  
 
situations, chronological age has been the basis for imposition of a restraint on  
 
the minor's freedom of choice. (ibid, p. 103; 105) 
 
 At the time, the NARA Pro-Choice America Foundation believed that this was a 
sharp limitation on the right to choose (Justice, 2009).  This thesis argues that despite the 
parental consent notification required for which Stevens voted for, this decision was less 
about abortion and more about the privacy rights for adolescents, a topic which goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  It is simply mentioned because it was the only restriction 
that Stevens ever applied to abortion.  Stevens has always been supportive of abortion 
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rights (Justice, 2009). 
 Stevens believes that abortion should remain a private decision that is best 
decided by the main person involved – the woman – instead of legislatures or judges 
(Rosen, 2007).  Stevens‟ concurrence in another abortion case perhaps best explains his 
constitutional philosophy about abortion and the importance of a woman‟s privacy when 
deciding whether to abort a pregnancy: “Acceptance of the fundamental premises that 
underlie the decision in Roe v. Wade, as well as the application of those premises in that 
case, places the primary responsibility for decision in matters of childbearing squarely in 
the private sector of our society.” See  Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, 475 U.S. 747, 781 (1986). 
 Another example of Stevens‟ belief in the constitutionality of abortion is in the 
1989 case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.  The constitutional question at 
hand was whether Missouri could prevent abortions from being performed in public 
hospitals. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).  Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist‟s ideological view was that the constitutional standard 
concerning abortion needed to be changed.  He believed that a woman‟s right to have an 
abortion was protected by the Constitution, but it could nonetheless be regulated by the 
states so long as the regulation was in the interest of the state (Tushnet, 2005).   
Stevens wrote a letter to Rehnquist stating that his approach to the case “`gave `no 
weight at all‟ to „the woman‟s interest in making the abortion decision‟” (quoted in 
Tushnet, 2005, p. 206).  To make his point, Stevens offered several regulations that 
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would survive Rehnquist‟s requirements which included placing a tax on abortions 
(Greenhouse, 2005) and “tests of the woman‟s knowledge of Shakespeare or American 
history” (Tushnet, 2005, p. 207).  Of course, rational tests would not incorporate such 
nonsensical matters.  Stevens criticized Rehnquist‟s encroachment upon the very 
“foundation…[of the] „right to privacy‟ upon which Roe had been built” (Smolla, 1995, 
p. 81).  Stevens‟ words to Rehnquist were “a credential of abortion rights liberalism” 
(Smolla, 1995, p. 81).  Ultimately, Rehnquist was deprived of the majority vote to 
implement his position. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 
(1989). 
In 1992, the Court was given the opportunity to uphold Roe v. Wade or overturn it 
completely.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey challenged the 
constitutionality of Pennsylvania‟s abortions restrictions, which included the requirement 
that a woman notify her husband and wait 24 hours before having an abortion. See 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  At 
the heart of the case, though, was whether Roe v. Wade would survive.  Many observers 
of the Court thought that Roe would be overruled because of the retirements of Roe-
supporting justices and the addition of justices who were definitively more conservative 
than their predecessors (Epstein & Walker, 2001).  During oral arguments for Casey, the 
counsel for the George H.W. Bush administration urged the Court to overturn Roe (Irons, 
1999).  Stevens questioned the administration‟s argument and “asked to see the provision 
that made fetuses „persons‟ with legal rights” (Irons, 1999, p. 456).  
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Stevens joined four other members of the Court and upheld the central rulings of 
Roe.  Justices David Souter, Sandra O‟Connor, and Anthony Kennedy issued a joint 
majority opinion.  The majority explained that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a 
person‟s right to privacy: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one‟s own concept 
of existence.” See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 852 (1992).   
Furthermore, the majority felt obligated to protect the liberties of individual 
persons and not apply a moral code to people‟s lives:  “Some of us as individuals find 
abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality but that cannot control our 
decision.  Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral 
code” (ibid, p. 911). 
Stevens‟ concurrence in Casey elucidated the importance of following precedent: 
The Court is unquestionably correct in concluding that the doctrine of stare 
decisis has controlling significance in a case of this kind...the central holding of 
Roe v. Wade…[has been] a "part of our law" for almost two decades…[and] it 
was a natural sequel to the protection of individual liberty established in Griswold 
v. Connecticut.  Roe is an integral part of a correct understanding of both the 
concept of liberty and the basic equality of men and women… part of the 
constitutional liberty to choose is the equal dignity to which each of us is entitled. 
(ibid, p. 919-20) 
Stevens acknowledged that “the State may promote its preferences by  
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funding childbirth, by creating and maintaining alternatives to abortion, and by  
espousing the virtues of family” (ibid, p. 916).  However, any limitations set by the state 
cannot infringe upon an individual‟s right to have an abortion (ibid). 
Casey’s core concept of liberty is one of much debate (Levin, 2005).  The 
Constitution does not list every right that people have, but liberty is one of those “rights 
beyond those described by the Bill of Rights” (Garbus, 2002, p. 83).  Justice William 
Brennan once very eloquently defined liberty: 
I would identify three groups of fundamental freedoms that “liberty” 
encompasses…first, freedom from bodily restraints or inspection, freedom to do 
with one‟s body as one likes and freedom to care for one‟s health and person; 
second, freedom of choice in basic decisions of life, such as marriage, divorce, 
procreation, contraception, and the education and upbringing of children; and 
third, autonomous control over the development and expression of one‟s intellect 
and personality. (as quoted in Garbus, 2002, p. 83-84) 
Stevens has also ruled that partial-birth abortions are a constitutionally protected 
privacy right.  In 2000, Stevens sided with the majority in Stenberg v. Carhart when the 
Court struck down a Nebraska state law banning the procedure, because its lack of 
exception for when a woman‟s life is in danger. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 
(2000).  Furthermore, Stevens‟ concurring opinion questioned how the state could 
possibly have “any legitimate interest in requiring a doctor to follow any procedure other 
than the one that he or she reasonably believes will best protect the woman” (ibid, p. 
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946). 
However, in 2007 the Court revisited the constitutionality of partial-birth 
abortions.  In the case of Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court upheld the federal government‟s 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, thus overruling the decision in Stenberg. See Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  Stevens joined Justice Ginsburg‟s dissent in declaring that 
the Court “refuses to take Casey and Stenberg seriously…[by ignoring]…the principles 
of stare decisis” (ibid, p. 3) and the Court‟s action was “effort to chip away at a right 
declared again and again by this Court” (ibid, p. 24). 
Stevens has also applied the right to privacy to cases involving gay rights.  
Stevens‟ judicial record on gay rights has consistently indicated an effort to extend 
constitutional rights to homosexuals (Murdoch & Price, 2001).  Even early in his tenure 
on the Supreme Court, Stevens openly expressed a willingness to review cases involving 
gay rights.  In 1976, Stevens, along with Justices Thurgood Marshall and William 
Brennan, voted for the Court to hear Doe v Commonwealth, a case challenging Virginia‟s 
anti-sodomy laws. See Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney for the City of Richmond, 403 F. 
Supp. 1199 E.D. Va. (1975).  However, the Court never heard the case, for lack of a 
fourth vote to hear it (McKeever, 1993).  
It wouldn‟t be until 1986 that the Court decided the legality of laws banning gay 
sex.  Bowers v. Hardwick arose from a civil lawsuit brought by Michael Hardwick 
against the state of Georgia for violation of his constitutional rights.  Hardwick was 
arrested for violating a Georgia statute that banned sodomy.  A police officer came to 
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Hardwick‟s residence to serve him a warrant for failure to pay a fine.  The officer 
obtained permission to enter the resident from Hardwick‟s roommate, and subsequently 
found him engaged in sexual relations with another man.  The officer arrested Hardwick, 
who spent twelve hours in jail before being released.  Although criminal charges were 
dropped, Hardwick filed a civil lawsuit. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
During oral arguments, counsel for the state of Georgia, Michael Hobbs, defended 
the statue by declaring that homosexuals did not have a “`constitutional „right‟…to 
engage in [sexual relations]…or any other type of extramarital sexual relationship`” 
(quoted in Murdoch & Price, 2001, p. 296).  Furthermore, Hobbs “tried to de-sex the 
Court‟s privacy decisions” (Murdoch & Price, 2001, p. 296).   
In response, Stevens tore away at Hobb‟s argument by forcing Hobbs to admit 
that it would be unconstitutional to prosecute a married heterosexual couple for sodomy.  
Stevens then asked why Georgia did not follow through with prosecuting Hardwick 
instead of dropping the charge against him.  Hobbs replied that was hard to enforce the 
statute (Murdoch & Price, 2001).  Stevens then pointed out the case was “`presented on a 
silver platter and they declined to go forward...it seems to me there is some tension 
between the obvious ability to convict this gentleman and the supposed interest in general 
enforcement‟” (quoted in Murdoch & Price, 2001, p. 297). 
In a 5-4 vote, with Stevens in the minority, the Court rejected Hardwick‟s “claim 
that homosexual sodomy is a fundamental right…[because there was] little or no textual 
support in the constitutional language…despite the due process clauses of the Fifth and 
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Fourteenth Amendments.” See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).  The 
majority opinion, written by Justice Byron White, pointedly acknowledged that the 
Court‟s prior decisions on the rights to privacy involving marriage, family, and 
procreation did not extend to homosexual activity (ibid). 
Moreover, White noted that homosexuality was considered a crime under English 
common law, as well as prohibited by the thirteen original colonies.  Even as late as 
1961, sodomy was a crime in all fifty states (ibid).  Therefore, White believed that 
claiming that a “right to engage in such conduct is „deeply rooted in this Nation‟s history 
and tradition,‟ or „implicit in the concept of ordered liberty‟ is, at best, facetious” (ibid, p. 
194). 
In his dissent, Stevens countered White‟s moral argument: “The fact that the 
government majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral 
is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law” (ibid, p. 216).  Stevens‟ dissent clearly 
articulated his liberal view of gay rights.  A liberal jurisprudence holds that a person has 
the right to privacy and there should not be any government restrictions on it, so long as 
no one else is being hurt by the behavior of the individual, even if the majority of society 
dislikes it (Schwartz, 2002). 
Furthermore, Stevens chided the majority for ignoring previous precedents that 
has been established concerning the sexual freedom of people:  “Individual decisions by 
married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not 
intended to produce offspring, are a form of „liberty‟ protected by the Due Process Clause 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment.…moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by 
unmarried as well as married persons.” See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 214 
(1986). 
Critics of the Court‟s decision compare Bowers to being the “Dred Scott 
case…for the gay rights movement” (Kaiser, 1997, p. 320) because the highest court in 
the land had the chance to bring equality to gays and lesbians, but instead chose not to.  
Stevens, though, showed that he supports liberty for gays and lesbians (Murdoch & Price, 
2001) when he said that “every free citizen has the same interest in „liberty‟ that the 
members of the majority share…the homosexual and the heterosexual have the same 
interest in deciding how he will live his own life…[and] intrusion into the private conduct 
of either is equally burdensome.” See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 218-219 
(1986).  This passage is perhaps the most indicative foreshadowing of why Stevens 
would have ruled for same-sex marriage. 
Seventeen years after Bowers, Stevens‟ dissent in the case would have the chance 
to become Court precedent when it became the basis for the landmark gay rights ruling in 
Lawrence v. Texas.  The case eliminated bans on intimate acts between homosexuals that 
Bowers had upheld. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
The facts of Lawrence are very similar to those of Bowers.  Houston police 
received a call reporting that a man with a gun was causing a disturbance. County sheriff 
deputies arrived at the apartment where the man allegedly was.  There was not a gunman 
at all.  Instead, the deputies entered the apartment (the door was ajar) and caught Tyron 
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Garner and John Lawrence having sex.  The two men were arrested for violating Texas 
law.  Believing that their rights had been violated, they went to court (ibid).  
The case was decided in a 6-3 vote.  Stevens assigned Justice Anthony Kennedy 
to write the majority opinion. Kennedy relied heavily on Stevens‟ dissent in Bowers.  The 
right to privacy was central to the Lawrence decision (ibid).  According to Kennedy, the 
country‟s “laws and traditions afford constitutional protection to personal decisions 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education” (ibid, p. 574).  Therefore, these traditions and laws had to be extended to 
homosexual relationships because banning such relations “furthers no legitimate state 
interest which can justify its intrusion in to the personal and private life of the individual” 
(ibid, p. 560). 
Kennedy admitted that Lawrence was in fact a departure from stare decisis (ibid).  
But sometimes the Court must ignore that practice and fix past injustices that have been 
brought upon people (Gerstmann, 2004).  Kennedy explained that respecting Court 
precedent is important so that the law has stability, but there are times when a prior 
decision is a mistake and should be reversed. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
Stevens adhered to stare decisis (Stevens, 1982), but he rejected it when he 
believed that a prior case had been decided incorrectly (Abraham, 1992) so it is no 
surprise that he would support Lawrence to overrule Bowers.  In the end, Lawrence 
became “the greatest legal victory that gay Americans…[had] ever won” (Devins & 
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Douglas, 2004, p. 57). 
The Court‟s ruling in Lawrence did not come without criticism.  Justice Antonin 
Scalia‟s dissent in the case accused the Court of taking sides in America‟s culture wars. 
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  Critics of the Court‟s decision in Lawrence 
feared that the case planted the seeds for a constitutional challenge by homosexuals 
seeking the right to marry (Devins & Douglas, 2004).  Scalia wondered what the 
implications of Lawrence on the issue of same-sex marriage would be: 
If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is „no state interest‟ for purposes 
of proscribing [private adult sex]…[then] what justification could there possibly 
be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples?  Surely not the 
encouragement to procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to. See 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 604-605 (2003). 
Meanwhile, Kennedy emphasized Lawrence was about sex, not whether the government 
must formally recognize same-sex relationships (ibid). 
 Critics of the Court say cases like Casey and Bowers illustrate why Stevens was a 
judicial activist: his support for the constitutional principle of the right to privacy is 
“subverting the Constitution at will, and using…public trust to impose…policy 
preferences on society” (Levin, 2005, p. 22).  Criticism of the Court‟s recognition of the 
right to privacy goes back to when the precedent was set in Griswold v. Connecticut 
(Bork, 1990).  Because the right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution, critics contend that Griswold was just the beginning of the Court‟s creating 
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new rights “without support in constitutional text or history” (Bork, 1990, p. 113).   
Critics will acknowledge that there are “certain areas or zones of privacy or 
freedom [that] are protected by the Constitution…that…[have] specific textual support” 
(Bork, 1990, p. 113).  An example of this would be the Fourth Amendment which 
protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures.  However, the Constitution‟s 
limited scope regarding right to privacy does not explicitly mention issues like abortion 
or contraception use (Bork, 1990).  Strict constructionists, who see the Constitution as an 
unchanging charter rather than a constantly evolving document, argue that only the 
legislative branch can make decisions about broadening the Constitution‟s scope (Levin, 
2005).   
Stevens‟ unfailing support of liberty indicates that he would have supported same-
sex marriage.  He was not a judge who stepped backwards.  Instead, he was a judge who 
evolved (Simon, 1995).  An example of this would be in a speech that Stevens gave in 
1991.  He lambasted the Court about some recent decisions it had handed down. He felt 
that it had become “extraordinarily aggressive…[by] narrowing the Constitution‟s 
protection of civil liberties…[and depreciating] the value of liberty” (Simon, 1995, p. 
226).  This statement confirms that Stevens‟ judicial interpretation of the Constitution is a 
liberal one. 
As demonstrated by his jurisprudence in the previous cases, it is evident the right 
to privacy/liberty comprises a large portion of Stevens‟ constitutional foundation.  He has 
elucidated this fact in questions at oral arguments and in his judicial opinions.  By 
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applying this principle in cases involving gay rights and abortion as well as his respect 
for the constitutional precedents established in cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, it can 
be extrapolated that he would have applied it to a case involving same-sex marriage.  As 
the right to privacy has evolved in the American judicial system (Glenn, 2003), so has 
marriage (Chauncey, 2004).  Stevens would have presumably helped the institution of 
marriage evolve even further to encompass same-sex couples.  Despite the critics who 
contend that a constitutional interpretation like Stevens‟ is wrong and usurps the other 
branches of government (Levin, 2005), Stevens‟ judicial record proves that he would step 
in and argue in favor of issues that he believed to be Constitutional.   
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Table 4.1: Record of Justice John Paul Stevens With Regard to Right to Privacy Cases 
 
 
U.S. Supreme Court Case 
 
 
John Paul Stevens 
Supports or Rejects 
 
 
1. Roe v. Wade (1973) – This case struck down laws in 
every state that restricted a women‟s access to an abortion 
on the basis of a right to privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973).  
 
 
 
Supports 
 
2. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey (1992) - This case upheld the ruling of Roe’s right to 
privacy, which constitutionally protected a woman‟s right 
to choose. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).   
 
 
 
 
Supports 
 
 
3. Stenberg v. Carhart (2000) – The Court ruled if 
exceptions are not made to protect a mother‟s life, partial-
birth abortions are an unconstitutional violation of a 
woman‟s right to privacy. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 
U.S. 914 (2000).   
 
 
 
 
Supports 
 
4. Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) – The Court held that the 
Constitution did not protect a right for sexual relations 
between homosexuals. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986).   
 
 
 
Rejects 
 
5. Lawrence v. Texas (2003) – The Court overruled Bowers 
by striking down a Texas law that criminalized sexual 
intimacy between consenting adults of the same gender.  
Furthermore, any remaining sodomy laws in the United 
States were deemed unconstitutional. See Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).   
 
 
 
 
Supports 
 
42 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Abraham, H. (1992). Justices and presidents: A political history of appointments to the  
Supreme Court. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bork, R. (1990). The tempting of America: The political seduction of the law. New York:  
Touchstone. 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
Chauncey, G. (2004). Why marriage: The history shaping today’s debate over gay 
equality. New York: Basic Books. 
Devins, N., & Douglas, D. (2004). A year at the Supreme Court. Durham, NC: Duke  
University Press. 
Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney for the City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.  
1975). 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
Epstein, L., & Walker, T. (2001). Constitutional law for a changing America: Rights,  
liberties, and justice. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
Feigen, B. (2004, November 15). Same-sex marriage: An issue of constitutional rights  
not moral opinions. Retrieved August, 21, 2008, from  
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/jlg/vol27/feigen.php 
Garbus, M. (2002). Courting disaster: The Supreme Court and the unmaking of American  
law. New York: Times Books. 
Gerstmann, E. (2004). Same-sex marriage and the Constitution. New York: Cambridge  
43 
 
 
University Press. 
Glenn, R. (2003). The right to privacy: Rights and liberties under the law. Santa Barbara,  
CA: ABC-CLIO. 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
Greenhouse, L. (2005). Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry Blackmun’s Supreme Court  
journey. New York: Times Books. 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
Horan, D., Forsythe, C., & Grant, E. (1987). Two ships passing in the night: An 
 interpretivist review of the White-Stevens colloquy on Roe v. Wade. Saint Louis  
University Law Review, 6, 229-312. Retrieved March 16, 2008, from HeinOnline  
database. 
Irons, P. (1999). A people’s history of the Supreme Court. New York: Viking. 
Justice John Paul Stevens. (2009). NARAL Pro-Choice America Foundation.  
Retrieved on June 16, 2010, from  
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/files/Courts-SCOTUS-Stevens-bio.pdf 
Kaiser, C. (1997). The gay metropolis. New York: Grove Press. 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
Lazarus, E. (1999). Closed chambers: The rise, fall, and future of the modern Supreme  
Court. New York: Penguin Books. 
Levin, M. (2005). Men in black: How the Supreme Court is destroying America.  
 Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc. 
44 
 
 
McKeever, R. (1993). Raw judicial power? The Supreme Court and American society.  
 
New York: Manchester University Press. 
 
Murdoch, J., & Price, D. (2001). Courting justice: Gay men and lesbians v. the 
 Supreme Court. New York: Basic Books. 
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
Richards, D. (2005). The case for gay rights: From Bowers to Lawrence and beyond.  
Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
Rosen, J. (2007, September 23). The dissenter. The New York Times. Retrieved  
September 25, 2007, from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/ 
23stevenst.html?ex=1348200000&en=1ef76c6e502a4c91&ei=5088&partner=rssn
yt&emc=rss 
Schwartz, H. (Ed). (2002). The Rehnquist Court: Judicial activism on the right.  
 
 New York: Hill and Wang. 
 
Simon, J. (1995). The center holds: The power struggle inside the Rehnquist Court. New  
 
York: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Smolla, R. (1995). A year in the life of the Supreme Court. Durham, NC: Duke  
 
University Press. 
 
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
45 
 
 
 
Stevens, J.P. (1982). Some thoughts on judicial restraint. Judicature, 66(5), 177-183.  
 
Retrieved March 16, 2008, from HeinOnline database. 
 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 475 U.S. 747  
 
(1986). 
 
Tushnet, M. (2005). A court divided: The Rehnquist Court and the future of constitutional  
law. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND EQUAL RIGHTS 
 In addition to the constitutional principle of the right to privacy, equal rights could 
be the other constitutional principle applied in a case involving same-sex marriage 
(Feigen, 2004).  Stevens‟ juridical history on equal rights is indicative that this might 
have been the principle he would have applied to find that same-sex marriage is 
constitutional.  A summary of Stevens‟ record in cases involving equal rights can be 
found in Table 5.1. 
Stevens‟ views on equal rights became evident when he served as a law clerk in 
the 1940s for Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge (Thai, 2006).  Years before Brown 
v. Board of Education (the landmark case that desegregated schools), Stevens expressed 
the opinion that “segregation [should] be ruled unconstitutional” (Amann, 2006, p. 1573).  
As a circuit judge, Stevens believed that minority groups should receive equal treatment 
from the states (Becker & Walsh, 1976).  As a Supreme Court justice, Stevens was very 
protective of  equal rights for groups like women, prisoners, and homosexuals (Arledge, 
1989).  Stevens has consistently voted for equal protection guarantees for gays and 
lesbians (Murdoch & Price, 2001).   
The Supreme Court‟s first major homosexual equal rights case was Romer v. 
Evans.  Romer concerned the constitutionality of a proposed amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution that would have prevented cities and municipalities from passing laws that 
prohibited sexual orientation-based discrimination in employment, housing, public 
accommodations, and other areas.  The amendment was immediately challenged in court.  
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The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the amendment was unconstitutional.  The case 
was appealed to the Supreme Court. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
During oral arguments, lawyers for the state of Colorado claimed that 
Amendment 2 came to fruition because homosexual groups were trying to seek special 
rights.  Stevens wanted the counsel to explain the rational basis for the amendment 
(Murdoch & Price, 2001).  After hearing contradictory answers, Stevens finally got the 
counsel to admit that gays and lesbians, as well as bisexuals, “could be refused service in 
a restaurant, turned away from an inn or turned down for a job because of their sexual 
orientation” (Murdoch & Price, 2001, p. 469). 
Eventually, by a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court struck down Amendment 2.  To 
assure that the majority held together, Stevens chose Justice Kennedy to write the opinion 
for him and the liberal bloc.  Kennedy began the opinion with the fiery line:  “One 
century ago…Justice Harlan admonished the Court that the Constitution „neither knows 
nor tolerates classes among citizens.‟” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).  
Kennedy found Amendment 2 directly violated this principle (ibid).   
The opinion held that “if the constitutional conception of „equal protection of the 
laws‟ means anything…[the] desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest” (ibid, p. 624).  The amendment represented 
nothing more than animosity towards gays and lesbians (ibid).  The 6-3 decision showed 
the nation that Stevens as well as five other justices were “comfortable with the idea of 
gay people as citizens, as people who exist beyond sexual acts” (Murdoch & Price, 2001, 
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p. 482).  
 In 2000, Stevens‟ support of homosexuals was never more apparent than in Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale (Murdoch & Price, 2001), which addressed whether a public 
organization is required to admit everyone.  Specifically, the case involved the Boys 
Scouts chapter in New Jersey.  When the organization revoked the membership of an 
openly gay scout member, the scout claimed that the Boys Scouts had violated a New 
Jersey statute that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation. See Boy Scouts 
of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).  
In contrast, the Boy Scouts believed that being required to admit homosexuals 
violated their constitutional rights.  The Boy Scouts argued that they were entitled to 
decide who could join their organization, and, finding homosexuality incompatible with 
the organization‟s value system, moved to exclude those with contradictory values (ibid). 
 In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court supported the position of the Boy Scouts.  The 
Court held that the Boy Scouts had the right to deny homosexuals membership in the 
organization because it was protected by the First Amendment‟s right to free association.  
In response, Stevens chose himself to write a dissent for the liberal bloc (ibid).  He 
believed that the majority excluded homosexuals from the Constitution‟s protection:  
The only apparent explanation for the majority's holding, then, is that 
homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that their presence 
alone-unlike any other individual's-should be singled out for special First 
Amendment treatment. Under the majority's reasoning, an openly gay male is 
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irreversibly affixed with the label „homosexual.‟ That label, even though unseen, 
communicates a message that permits his exclusion wherever he goes. His 
openness is the sole and sufficient justification for his ostracism.  Though 
unintended, reliance on such a justification is tantamount to a constitutionally 
prescribed symbol of inferiority. (ibid, p. 696) 
In addition, Stevens pointedly noted that the treatment of homosexuals must 
change as society changes: 
Unfavorable opinions about homosexuals `have ancient roots‟…Over the years, 
however, interaction with real people, rather than mere adherence to traditional 
ways of thinking about members of unfamiliar classes, have modified those 
opinions...[However, it is clear that] prejudices are still prevalent and that they 
have caused serious and tangible harm to countless members of the class New 
Jersey seeks to protect. (ibid, p. 699-700) 
Stevens‟ pro-gay argument in Boy Scouts could easily be applied to same-sex marriage 
(Merin, 2002). 
In 1998, Stevens joined a Court decision that ruled that Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act protects individuals from harassment, not only from members of the opposite 
sex, but also the same gender.  The case of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 
(1998) concerned a heterosexual man (Oncale) who worked for Sundowner Offshore 
Services on an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico.  Oncale alleged that he had been sexually 
harassed, both verbally and physically, by three male co-workers – including two 
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supervisors.  Oncale reported his co-workers to the company management.  The co-
workers were not reprimanded, though.  Oncale quit because he feared that he would be 
raped and he filed a lawsuit. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 
(1998).  
Oncale‟s lawsuit was dismissed by the U.S. Court of Appeals.  It ruled that Title 
VII does not protect a person from harassment by a person of the same gender.  Oncale 
appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Court reversed the lower court‟s decision (ibid).  
Oncale is considered a very important gay rights victory because it expanded the scope of 
protection of Title VII (Barnhart & Zalesne, 2004) to include gays and lesbians in 
protection from workplace harassment (Lambda, 1998).    
The Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth et al case was a legal 
challenge by a group of conservative law students at the University of Wisconsin.  The 
lawsuit challenged the university‟s policy of using mandatory student activity fees that 
funded all student groups.  There were some groups (gay groups, specifically) that held 
viewpoints with which the plaintiffs disagreed. See Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. 
System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).  The university believed that “such fees 
enhance students' educational experience by promoting extracurricular activities, 
stimulating advocacy and debate on diverse points of view, enabling participation in 
campus administrative activity, and providing opportunities to develop social skills, all 
consistent with the University's broad educational mission” (ibid, p. 219). 
During oral arguments for the case, Stevens told the plaintiff‟s counsel that 
51 
 
 
despite the conservative students‟ objections, the “`university, as a state actor, has a duty 
to respect the right of conscience [of all students]‟” (quoted in Lithwick, 1999, ¶ 15).  
Stevens and a unanimous Court ruled that student groups at public universities are 
protected by the First Amendment. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 219.  It held that it is important that “minority views are 
treated with the same respect as are majority views” (ibid, p. 235).  The case laid the 
foundation for the protection of freedom speech for all public university students, 
including gays and lesbians (Board - Amicus, 2000).  
In addition to favoring equal protection of gay rights, Stevens was a strong 
protector of women‟s rights.  He consistently sought to invalidate “laws or policies 
distinguishing between the sexes” (Lamb & Halpern, 1991, p. 363).  In 1996, Stevens 
was part of a Court decision that struck down the Virginia Military Institute‟s policy of 
admitting only men. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
The case began in 1989 when an unidentified woman applied to the school, but 
was denied admission.  The Justice Department sued on the behalf of the woman, 
claiming that the school was violating the civil rights of women.  The school argued that 
its almost 200-year-old policy of single-sex education was a diversified educational 
approach.  The United States Justice Department had countered that the college‟s 
segregation by sex was unconstitutional and comparable to racial segregation (ibid).  The 
Court‟s majority opinion, written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, held that the policies 
like that of the VMI could “not be used to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and 
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economic inferiority of women” (ibid, p. 516). 
Stevens has also supported equal protection for prisoners (Arledge, 1989) and 
detainees (Amann, 2006).  His jurisprudence on the constitutional treatment of these 
groups became evident early in his career as a circuit judge. See United States ex rel 
Miller v. Twomey, 479 F 2d. 701 (7
th
 Cir. 1973).  Stevens claimed that “the restraints and 
punishment which criminal conviction entails do not place a citizen beyond the ethical 
tradition that accords respect to the dignity and intrinsic worth of every 
individual…`liberty‟ and `custody‟ are not mutually exclusive concepts” (ibid, p. 712). 
In 1984, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to 
prison inmates. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).  Stevens dissented and 
believed that “prisoners are truly the outcasts of society…disenfranchised, scorned and 
feared, often deservedly so, shut away from public view…[they] are surely a „discrete 
and insular minority‟” (ibid, p. 557). 
When it comes to the issue of the “war on terror” and the detainment of suspected 
terrorists at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Stevens served as the 
leader of the Court‟s critical review of the government‟s policies (Congressional 
Research Service, 2010).  Stevens‟ background has made him perhaps the most qualified 
justice to decide military matters.  By the time he retired, Stevens was the only sitting 
justice who was a military veteran (Toobin, 2010).  He has stated that his “`experiences 
during World War II have shaped my thinking in some cases‟” (quoted in Interview, 
2009, p. 9).   
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In addition to his military experience, Stevens‟ experience as a law clerk for 
Supreme Court Justice Wiley B. Rutledge right after World War II exposed him to legal 
cases that dealt with military and national security issues, most notably the issue of 
habeas corpus in the case Ahrens v. Clark  (Barnhart & Schlickman, 2010).  The case 
stemmed from the detention of a hundred and twenty German-born residents of the U.S. 
during World War II.  As of 1948, they were still being confined to Ellis Island.  The big 
question surrounding the case was whether the detainees could challenge their detainment 
in an American Court. See Ahrens V. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).  The issue of habeas 
corpus is extremely important because it is the “building block of a free society and the 
foundation of a fair judicial system...dating back at least to the Magna Carta in thirteenth-
century England” (Barnhart & Schlickman, 2010, p. 73).  
 In a memo written to his boss, Stevens opined that “`I should think that even an 
alien enemy ought to be entitled to a fair hearing on the question whether he is in fact 
dangerous‟” (quoted in Toobin, 2010, ¶ 47).  Furthermore, Stevens believed that the case 
“`raised an issue affecting every member of the community equally‟” (quoted in Barnhart 
& Schlickman, 2010, p. 72).   
 However, Stevens and Rutledge would be on the losing end of the case. Six of 
the nine justices would disagree with the two men. See Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 
(1948).  In response, Stevens and Rutledge accused the Court of playing with fire: 
The Court...cuts much more sweepingly at the roots of individual freedom...[and] 
attenuates the personal security of every citizen. So does any serious contraction 
54 
 
 
in the availability of the writ of habeas corpus.  For the first time this Court puts a 
narrow and rigid territorial limitation upon issuance of the writ by the inferior 
federal courts. Heretofore such constrictive formulations have been avoided 
generally, even assiduously, out of regard for the writ's great office in the 
vindication of personal liberty. (ibid, 194) 
Stevens and Rutledge, however, would be vindicated many years later when the same 
issue came before the Court in the 21
st
 century.  Stevens would use the dissent in Ahrens 
as his basis for his majority opinion in 2004‟s Rasul v. Bush (Barnhart & Schlickman, 
2010, p. 73).  Rasul held that detainees at Guantanamo Bay could invoke habeas corpus. 
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).   
 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld would eventually follow in 2006.  The majority opinion in 
Hamdan would also be written by Stevens.  The Court ruled that the Bush administration 
violated the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice when it 
created military commissions to try Guantanamo Bay detainees. See Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).   Although a lot of the opinion is about governmental 
procedure, it is largely concerned about fairness and the need for protections, especially 
from the judicial branch: “These review bodies clearly lack the structural insulation from 
military influence that characterizes the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and thus 
bear insufficient conceptual similarity to state courts” (ibid, 23). 
 Although Rasul and Hamdan were decided on statutory grounds and did not 
specifically address whether the detainees had a constitutional right to challenge their 
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detention in U.S. courts, they laid the ground work for Boumediene v. Bush 
(Congressional Research Service, 2010).  In Boumediene, the Court found that the 
detainees are protected by the Constitution. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008).  No matter how despicable a criminal/terrorist might be, Stevens supported rights 
for that person: “If this Nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it 
must not wield the tools of tyrants even to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.” See 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004). 
 The Constitution provides equal rights protection to Americans, but the extent to 
which these protections are extended remains hotly contested (Rosen, 2006).  Critics 
contend that expanding the scope of equal rights and including minorities in areas where 
they were previously excluded in the Constitution qualifies as judicial activism (Keck, 
2004).  In the case of same-sex marriage, there is bound to be continuous disagreement as 
to whether gays and lesbians are being denied their equal rights by not being allowed to 
legally married (Schlafly, 2004).   
Stevens believes that equal rights that protect minorities should not be narrowed 
(Simon, 1995).  Perhaps his concurrence in Craig v. Boren (1976) most eloquently 
explains Stevens‟ viewpoint concerning equal protection and the Constitution: “There is 
only one Equal Protection Clause…it does not direct the Courts to apply one standard of 
review in some cases and a different standard in other cases.” See Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976).  Stevens applied this judicial viewpoint to a wide variety of 
minority groups: women, homosexuals, and prisoners.  Stevens would have undoubtedly 
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applied this principle in a case involving same-sex marriage. 
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     Table 5.1: Record of John Paul Stevens With Regard to Equal Rights Cases 
 
U.S. Supreme Court 
 
 
John Paul Stevens 
Supports or Rejects 
 
 
1. Romer v. Evans (1996) – The Court struck down a 
Colorado constitutional amendment that would have 
prevented sexual orientation from being protected by 
discrimination laws. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996).   
 
 
 
 
Supports 
 
 
2. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) – The Court held 
that despite existing state antidiscrimination laws, private 
organizations are allowed to exclude certain individuals 
based on the First Amendment‟s freedom of association. 
See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).   
 
 
 
 
Rejects 
 
3. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services (1998) - The 
Court held that protection afforded by Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was applicable to workplace 
harassment involving members of the same sex. See 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 
(1998).   
 
 
 
Supports 
 
4. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System 
v. Southworth et al (2000) – The Court ruled that 
mandatory student fees at public universities can be used to 
support gay student groups despite protests from 
conservative students. See Board of Regents of Univ. of 
Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
 
 
 
 
Supports 
 
5. United States v. Virginia (1996) – The Court held that 
the male-only admission policy at the Virginia Military 
Institute violated the Fourteenth Amendment‟s Equal 
Protection Clause. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515 (1996).   
 
 
 
Supports 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 Every civil rights movement is about a group of people who are “ignored or 
excluded…[from] the extensions of constitutional rights and protections.” See United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996).  Barely a decade into the 21
st
 century, it is 
now the country‟s sexual-orientation minority group that is fighting for its equal place 
alongside the majority in having marriage rights (Bonauto, 2007).  Pro-gay marriage 
advocates say that it is not just about marriage, but more “about the place of gay people 
in…society in the context of a century‟s worth of official anti-gay discrimination” 
(Bonauto, 2007, p. 814).   
Some people say that there has “never been a day when homosexuals have been 
denied the kind of rights…[like] black people…[with] separate water fountains, separate 
schools” (Suarez, 2006, p. 103).  The truth is, however, gays and lesbians have been 
legally disadvantaged by laws in the United States.  Homosexuals are similar to blacks in 
that both groups have experienced a “type of history that only a group with relatively 
little political power could have” (Simson, 2006, p. 372).  Although life for homosexuals 
has gradually improved since the Stonewall Riots (Carter, D., 2005), gays and lesbians 
across this country are still being denied access to the “Constitution‟s promises of 
equality and liberty” (Bonauto, 2007, p. 813) when the government denies them 
marriage, and when it “enforces a singular and inflexible definition of [it]” (Bernay, 
2008, p. 91).
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 Unless the U.S. Congress amends the Constitution to ban same-sex marriage, the 
Supreme Court will be the arbiter that will finally resolve the issue of same-sex marriage 
once and for all (Carter, J., 2005).  Unfortunately, Justice John Paul Stevens retired 
before he had an opportunity to be a part of the judgment on same-sex marriage.  Because 
of his support of privacy rights (Arledge, 1989) and equal rights (Justice, 1987), Stevens 
was the most supportive justice on the Supreme Court of gay rights (Murdoch & Price, 
2001).  This thesis concludes that it would only make sense that Stevens would have 
applied those same principles to a case involving same-sex marriage.  The right to 
privacy and equal rights are a natural extension of the history of Griswold and the 
subsequent rulings it has produced (Gerstmann, 2004).  As this thesis argues, Stevens was  
a “judicial activist,” but only when a precedent presents a gross constitutional violation 
(Levin, 2005).  When a judge like Stevens makes decisions that are reasoned well and 
principled, then judicial activism can be healthy (Lazarus, 1999).   
Stevens‟ extensive judicial record, in conjunction with the opinions he has 
expressed in arguments, interviews, and articles, substantiate the conclusion that Stevens 
would have extended the right to marry to homosexuals.  Stevens would not have risked 
his jurisprudential reputation by sanctioning a decision against marriage for gays and 
lesbians.  Had he done so, he would have thrown away all those years that he supported 
civil rights.  During an interview, Stevens was asked whether it was frustrating for him 
when the Court decides a case and he was in the minority. Stevens replied that “`when 
you‟re in dissent, you know one of two things: Either the court‟s wrong or you‟re wrong, 
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and you don‟t want either one of those things to be true… you‟d rather not be in dissent‟” 
(quoted in Interview, 2001, ¶ 24).  It is safe to say that Stevens would not have made a 
bad decision regarding marriage rights for a minority group that he has protected for 
years. 
After more than 34 years of service, John Paul Stevens retired from the Supreme 
Court in June 2010 (Gresko, 2010).  In one of the last cases before he retired, Stevens 
explained what a judge must do when the Constitution is silent on certain issues: “When 
answering a constitutional question to which the text provides no clear answer, there is 
always some amount of discretion; our constitutional system has always depended on 
judges filling in the document's vast open spaces.” See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 
____,  54 (2010).  As a justice, Stevens was an empathetic judge who was concerned 
about the rights of the individual and supported the promises of the Constitution.  Same-
sex marriage is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but this thesis argues that 
Stevens would have found constitutional support for it using his judicial vision to fill in 
the gaps that the Constitution has. 
On his last day on the Court, Stevens apologized if he had “`overstayed [his] 
welcome‟” (quoted in Gresko, 2010, ¶ 3) but he did so because he felt that being a 
Supreme Court justice “`is such a unique and wonderful job‟” (quoted in Gresko, 2010, ¶ 
3).  When asked about how he would want to be remembered after left the Court, Stevens 
hoped that people will judge him “`based on what my written opinions say…I just hope 
they say he did the best he could‟” (quoted in An Interview, 2007, ¶ 33).  
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